Introduction
Football is not only a social phenomenon, but an expanding industry that is heavily controlled by the sport's governing body, the Fédération International de Football Association (FIFA). FIFA, a private not-for-profit association with headquarters in Switzerland, attributes to itself the powers to govern and regulate world football in collaboration with continental confederations and national football associations (FAs) , from the rules of the game to the social and economic dimensions (FIFA 2015a, Articles 1-13).
At the moment, FIFA is engulfed in major scandals. An investigation led by the US and Swiss police authorities ended up with senior members of the governing body detained to be extradited to the United States, where they face accusation of alleged large-scale corruption, tax evasion and money laundering, among others (Gibson and Gayle 2015) . Misconduct and corruption within FIFA have been denounced for a long time (Jennings 2006; Calvert and Blake 2014) and there have been numerous calls to increase FIFA's accountability towards stakeholders and public authorities (Lyons et al. 2014) . After many years resisting calls for reform, FIFA president, Joseph Blatter, decided to lay down his position just days after being re-elected by the 2015 FIFA congress. However, Blatter announced that he will implement structural changes before an extraordinary congress elects his successor, to ensure an improved FIFA remains strong and independent (FIFA 2015b) . Thus, even in the middle of its most important crisis in decades, FIFA has signaled its will to keep in control of the reform agenda.
While the corruption cases are outside of the scope of this paper, the way FIFA muddles through them raises the perplexity of the observer and lead to more general questions that form the core of this article: Why has FIFA successfully occupied a regulatory space that could have belonged to public authorities given the importance of football as a socio-economic activity? Furthermore, how is it possible that a private not-for-profit organization with headquarters in Switzerland is able to claim and maintain its autonomy from the so-called shadow of hierarchy of public authorities (Chappelet 2010)? Indeed, FIFA aims to 'control every type of association football' (FIFA 2012, Article 2, emphasis added). Here, we explore the different ways in which FIFA defends its autonomy to govern football privately in the global and transnational market, without the intervention of public authorities. It is necessary to clarify from the outset that we do not argue that FIFA has infinite powers in every situation; what the article does is to focus on the balance of forces of FIFA, as a private organization, vis-à-vis public authorities in the transnational regulation of football. Thus, on a theoretical level, FIFA is not just a case study for football enthusiasts as it reminds scholars to abandon 'methodological nationalism' and to realize that global policies can be formulated and administered by completely private institutions (Stone and Ladi 2015) . Moreover, while scholars have focused on civil regulation employing soft law, FIFA illustrates that transnational private regulators can confront public authorities by relying on strong enforcement mechanisms.
The paper proceeds in four steps. First, we review the academic debates on transnational private regulation. Second, the paper examines why FIFA rose as a transnational private authority. It is argued that FIFA can impose its preferences on national governments because it controls access to global football as a 'club good' vital for national football industries. Third, as main empirical contribution the paper presents evidence of how FIFA exerted its power as transnational football regulator in three case studies against national governments of Greece, Spain and Poland. In the conclusion, we discuss the extent to which FIFA's multiple roles as regulator of the game, transnational corporation and grassroots movement can be contested by national governments on their own. We argue that due to football's character as grassroots movement, policy-makers at national level do not trust that the electorate will reward them for confronting FIFA. Accordingly, the present crisis might result in some organizational reforms, but FIFA is unlikely to waive its regulatory powers easily.
Transnational private regulation
Since Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) governance by non-state actors has increasingly occupied the attention of scholars (Mattli and Büthe 2005; Büthe 2010; Shamir 2011) . Private actors can participate in policy implementation (Pattberg 2005) , transnational corporations (TNCs) provide public goods for failing states (Börzel and Risse 2010) or impose their demands on developing countries (Koenig-Archibugi 2004) . Moreover, private actors are also engaged in transnational private regulation (TPR). Building on Pattberg (2005, p. 593) as well as Graz and Nölke (2007, p. 3), TPR can be defined as the ability of non-state actors to cooperate across borders in order to establish rules and standards of behavior in a distinct issue area accepted as legitimate by agents not involved in the rule definition. Thus, FIFA's regime can be conceptualized as a TPR since it establishes rules accepted by national FAs and governments. This raises the question of how private regulators claim power and how they exert it.
Scholars emphasizing the important role for TNCs in TPR claim that neoliberal ideology and the pursuit of corporate hegemony account for the rise of transnational private authority (Cutler et al. 1999; Johns 2007; Schäferhoff et al. 2009; Shamir 2011) . More functionalist approaches argue that globalization has created a mismatch between markets and politics in terms of governance. Accordingly, demand for rules has given rise to a variety of sources of supply (Haufler 2000) . Thus, private actors have assumed regulatory powers in order to deal with the necessities of global trade in the absence of international regulations by public authorities or effective intergovernmental regulatory action (Bartley 2007) . In other words, they fill a regulatory vacuum of 'old international governance' (Abbott and Snidal 2009, p. 577; Schäferhoff et al. 2009; Bomhoff and Meuweuse 2011) . The rise of private authority has also been framed as resulting from explicit or implicit delegation of certain functions by the state (Cutler et al. 1999 ).
Thus, there are diverging approaches to explaining and researching TPR. Vogel (2007 Vogel ( , 2010 has distinguished two forms of TPR: (1) transnational industry self-regulation; and (2) 'civil regulation'. Traditional industry self-regulation has been depicted as serving to overcome collective action problems and to reduce transaction costs by specifying technical rules and guidelines for various materials, products and processes (Vogel 2007; Bartley 2007) . In contrast, civil regulation specifies the responsibilities of global firms for addressing labor practices, environmental performance, and human rights policies (Vogel 2010, p. 68 ).
According to Vogel (2010) , civil regulation, intended to define standards for responsible business practices, is more likely to be politicized, transparent and to involve external stakeholders. In contrast, traditional industry self-regulation is depicted as intending to remove business regulation from public scrutiny. Given the diversity of industry self-regulation, which often anticipates public concerns (Gunningham and Reese 1997; Sinclair 1997; Black 2001) and an on-going debate about the rise of the regulatory state, which is supposed to rely on different forms of self-regulation (Levi-Faur 2014), Vogel's dichotomy appears reductionist. Thus, a central point made here is that, although global self-regulation is still under researched (Porter and Ronit 2006) scholars seem to have recently almost exclusively focused on civil regulation. While this interest in civil regulation has certainly generated new insights on TPR, it has also neglected some important phenomena.
First, research has emphasized the role of global civil society for the creation of civil regulations on global supply chains (Bartley 2007; Vogel 2010) . Second, scholars have provided new (albeit diverging) answers concerning the relationship between private governance and public authority. On the one hand, scholars stressed that powerful non-state actors might challenge the authority of sovereign states (Sending and Neumann 2008) . In particular, TNCs seem able to impose their rules on developing countries (Abbott and Snidal 2008, p. 538) . Further, it is also argued that TPRs can depoliticize policy issues (Nölke and Perry 2007) , which is likely to favor private actors over public authorities (Underhill and Zhang 2008) . On the other hand, Börzel and Risse (2010, p. 116) claim that private governance is still subject to the 'shadow of hierarchy', that is, a credible threat of state intervention. Accordingly, the shadow of hierarchy catalyzes 'voluntary agreement[s] closer to the common good rather than to particularistic self-interests'.
Again, this dichotomous approach to TPR power seems slightly reductionist, given the complexities of current societies and economies. Pattberg and Stripple (2008; Falkner 2003) argue that the study of transnational civil regulations needs to go beyond the public-private divide since civil regulations represent business-civil society collaborations involving NGOs and multi-stakeholder organizations (Vogel 2007; Cafaggi 2011) . Accordingly, Abbot and Snidal (2009) have suggested that civil regulations of transnational socio-economic activities are actually located in a governance triangle between public authorities, private firms and NGOs in which civil society or NGOs serve as 'rule demanders' and supervisors (Overdevest 2010) .
Thus, the case of football (or sport) is of academic interest because FIFA acts as both, a TNC marketing global football and a civil society not-for-profit NGO.
Here, the crucial point is that the recent debate on civil regulation has depicted an image of TPR as practice that operates besides or around the state. The fact that there exist TPRs that can effectively establish rules modifying domestic policies against governments' will is neglected. Moreover, the focus on civil regulation has resulted in a narrow perspective on TPR enforcement. It is commonly assumed that firms participate in private regulation because the benefits of participation received exceed their costs (Lenox 2006) . Potoski and Prakash (2005) argue that private regulation works because it provides specific 'club goods', that is, a non-rival but potentially excludable benefits. However, recent research on civil regulation has mainly dealt with 'soft law' mechanisms. Thus, the club good provided by civil regulations is mainly brand reputation, which is essential for TNCs (Vogel 2007 
Governance and regulation in transnational football
The governance of international football represents a mixture of a pyramid and a network of stakeholders, private commercial actors and public authorities (García 2007) . FIFA performs a three-fold role in the transnational governance of football:
Regulation and rule making; fund raiser (through exploitation of the World Cup) and subsidizer (of national FAs that receive solidarity funds); and a market gate keeper because FIFA membership is a precondition for participation in international football competitions (FIFA 2015a). These governance capacities are exceptional even for international sport governing bodies (Forster 2006; Forster and Pope 2004) Furthermore, FIFA increased this institutional first mover advantage when participating in international competitions came to equal being recognized as sovereign state in particular during decolonialization (Sugden and Tomlinson 1998; Darby 2005) . Decolonialization also changed the composition of FIFA's constituency and its expectations concerning FIFA's role. The new (non-European) FIFA members pushed for an increase in World Cup places and financial and technical aid (Sugden and Tomlinson 1998) . Moreover, these new members elected leaders to FIFA whose agenda was to commercialize the World Cup and to centralize FIFA's control over revenues, in order to share the increased income with the new developing football nations (Sugden and Tomlinson 1998; Murray 1999; Sugden 2002) . As Jennings (2012) discussed for the IOC, massive commercialization inevitably required substantial adaptations in organizational governance. In the case of FIFA, commercialization served to strengthen its status as governing body as the increased revenues were used to grant substantial development aid to member FAs, which served to attract even more members (Eisenberg 2006a (Eisenberg , 2006b ). In return, the financial dependence of smaller FAs on FIFA's support heavily benefitted the power of the FIFA executive, and the role of FIFA as a governing body itself (Eisenberg 2006a; Giulianotti and Robertson 2012) . With the exception of the international transfer system, these processes of expansion of FIFA, globalization and commercialization of the football industry developed with minimal intervention from governments and international organizations.
In result, FIFA claimed control of access to world football. Membership of FIFA is a necessary (pre)condition to participate in football's global competition structure, its revenue streams and regulation. Thus, FIFA membership provides access to 'club goods', which are vital for national football industries. Naturally, this provides FIFA with a privileged position. However, within the football industry, complex dependencies serve to limit FIFA's regulatory powers. For example, the regulation of clubs activities has generated tensions, especially in relation to transfers and release of players for international competition (see García and Meier 2012) . As clubs employ players, FIFA had to adapt to demands from clubs about compensation (Conway 2015) . Similarly, FIFA seems to be not always able to monitor its national or regional associations. This could be seen in the difficulties to implement antiracism policies or in Blatter's resignation speech where he blamed most of FIFA's problems on the excessive power of the continental confederations that had watered down his attempts for reform (FIFA 2015b) . However, research presented here focuses on the relationship of FIFA with national governments.
In this context it is relevant that FIFA demands independence from any third parties as a pre-requisite for national FA's membership (FIFA 2012, Article 13.1g). 
Enforcing regulation in international football: Three case studies
A case study approach is employed because it is particularly suited to investigate processes over a period of time (Yin 2014) . More specifically, our research design represents a form of 'theory-testing process tracing' aiming to provide evidence that a certain causal mechanism is present (Beach and Pedersen 2013) . In our case, the denial of club goods by FIFA is supposed to generate regulatory compliance. Thus, we deal with 'power in action' (Dahl 1957) , which can be measured as the impcact of FIFA's intervention on the behavior of political actors.
As case study research collects evidence from a diversity of sources in order to arrive at relevant conclusions (Yin 2014) , research presented is drawn from primary and secondary written sources: Official documents from FIFA, national FAs and national governments, as well as press reports and academic literature available.
However, despite repeated attempts to contact FIFA and the relevant governments, not a single positive response was received. To some extent government turnover might account for these non-responses. We have mitigated this with the use of public documents, press releases and interviews in the press, which are used as a proxy of the official position of the institutions. Whereas this is indeed acknowledged up front as a limitation of the article, we have taken enough steps to minimize the impact on the validity of the analysis.
Greece, Spain and Poland were selected because they represent countries (a)
where the rule of law is accepted and (b) where sport policy is made in a 'bureaucratic configuration' in which the sport bodies are supposed to act as agents for delivering government specified requirements and where they are accountable to the state (Henry and Ko 2009, pp. 30-5 
Regulatory outcomes
Greece. After FIFA's first intervention, the government abandoned the proposed 
Discussion and conclusion
Research presented here has explored the extent to which transnational industry selfregulation persists as a form of TPR able to challenge attempts by national governments to set rules in the sector. The cases show that FIFA is able to confront national governments and defend its autonomy to regulate football. Suspensions (or the threat of them) serve as an efficient means to enforce compliance of national FAs and public authorities. Governments even modify their sport policy and legislation once FIFA formally or informally requested so. FIFA even defined deadlines for governments to comply and devised road maps for conflict resolution. In Greece, well as for decolonialization (Sugden and Tomlinson 1998; Darby 2005) . Given the importance of sport for national identity politics, it seems safe to consider that suspension from a national team competition may not be well received by public opinion. Here, it is useful to recall the history of Sevilla FC and Celta de Vigo in Spain in 1995 (El Pais 1995). Administrative decisions relegated both clubs to play non-league football due to insolvency, which triggered public demonstrations of more than 250,000 people and finally resulted in a withdrawal of the decision.
Hence, whereas consumer campaigns account for transnational civil regulation, it seems that FIFA benefits from a lack of societal corrective forces. Quite the opposite, FIFA presides over a large grassroots movement, acting also as a notfor-profit NGO in football's transnational regime when it suits. Therefore, national governments seem to be willing to avoid conflicts with FIFA in order not to test the consequences of their policies in their voters at the cost of a suspension. This, in turn, can explain why FAs can escalate conflicts by involving FIFA.
Seen in the light of both current scandals and the debate about TPRs, the case of FIFA raises the more general question to what extent TPRs can escape becoming politicized. Our findings do not necessarily imply that governments cannot challenge the power of FIFA at all, but that it takes a lot of 'courage' for them to do so. So far the European Union is probably the only governmental organisation that has been able to exert some form of authority over football authorities. The EU requested that FIFA amends its international transfer system to some extent (García 2011 ) and forced UEFA to negotiate over the selling of broadcasting rights (García 2008 ). Yet, these interventions were controversial among the member states allowing the football bodies to reap substantial concessions from the initial EU demands (Meier and Online Appendix Dimitropoulos 2006; . In 1993, the Greek government intended to update governance structures in the face of sport commercialization and match fixing scandals.
Accordingly, the government proposed legislation to overhaul the nomination of referees for league and cup matches and the composition of sport disciplinary courts ( The government also proposed changes to the National Sports Act. Sport federations in the country were given six months to amend their statutes, including election systems . The legislation appears to have been intended to assume political control of the Greek FA (Anagnostopoulos 2011, pp. 212-3) . At least the incumbent HFF chairman, Vasilios Gagatsis, felt that the amendments reduced his chances for reelection. After HFF elections were finally held without changes in the electoral system, the Greek sport minister withheld all state funding of the HFF. The fact that FIFA obtained a full exemption of the HFF from the most important piece of legislation that regulates the sport sector clearly indicates FIFA's bargaining power.
FIFA vs. Spain: Informal Persuasion
In Spain the regulation of the sports sector is laid down in the Spanish Sports Act of 1990 (Law 10/1990), complemented with subsequent ministerial orders or decrees (Puig et al. 2010 ). The Act includes very specific provisions regarding the governing structures of professional sport . Thus, the Act defines the roles and responsibilities of sport federations. The informal character of the Spanish makes a clear-cut analysis difficult. Given the technical nature of the issue at stake, it is plausible that the government appreciated the unnecessary negative consequences that a formal FIFA intervention could have. Thus, the power of transnational football governance serves to discourage public authorities from upsetting the governing bodies.
FIFA vs. Poland: Protecting incapable governance
Poland has also an interventionist legislative framework for professional sport ( Since the willingness to host EURO-2012 seems decisive for the actions of the government, the Polish case illustrates the positive effects that football governance system creates for its constituents. National governments are happy to exploit football's political and economic value when they can, even if they have to share regulatory powers.
